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oAbstract
This paper uses pseudo panel techniques and a fixed effects estimator to analyse
the determinants of preferences for redistribution in 34 European countries over the
period 2002–2012. The data is drawn from the six available waves of the European
Social Survey. The main result is that changes in income inequality positively affect
changes in preferences for redistribution over time. Though this result is predicted
by standard political economy models, it has found little previous empirical support.
This study shows that, at least in Europe, growing income inequality leads to more
individual support for redistribution. The empirical results hold after performing a
variety of robustness checks regarding the construction of pseudo panels, the use of
lags and different measures of income inequality.
JEL codes: D31; D63; D72; H20
Keywords: Redistribution; Income Inequality; Preferences for redistribution; Pseudo
panels1 Introduction
A common topic of interest for economists and other social scientists is the formation
of preferences over how much income redistribution must be implemented, if any. As
pointed by Alesina and Giuliano (2011), this is the most important dividing line
between left and right political views concerning economic issues. Through political
voting, these preferences can play a significant role in the final level of redistribution
accomplished by the government. Early models of voting (Meltzer and Richard 1981)
show that the median voter is decisive in pushing for redistribution when the median
income is placed left of the mean income, i.e., when the income is unequally distrib-
uted. Although this model is insightful, there are missing mechanisms that, if
accounted for, will produce different results. For example, individuals belonging to the
lower part of the income distribution may have the expectation of upward mobility so
that they will prefer less redistribution (Piketty 1995; Benabou and Ok 2001). Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) show that societies where individual effort is believed to be the
main source of income formation will prefer less taxes and redistribution. The contrary
holds for societies that believe luck is important to create income, so they will prefer
more redistribution. Furthermore, Karabarbounis (2011) finds empirical support for
the ‘one dollar, one vote’ equilibrium, which means that richer groups of individuals
are able to put forward their agenda on less taxes and redistribution through their
economic and political influence.2015 Olivera. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
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tribution, mainly exploiting the cross-country variation1. Although all these works
are important in the literature of preferences for redistribution, they do not directly
address the determinants of changes in these preferences. One of the reasons of this
deficiency is the scarcity of adequate data for this purpose, i.e., panel data surveys
that include questions on redistributive preferences.
The aim of this paper is to study the determinants of preferences for redistribution in
Europe taking into account variation over time and country. Within this framework,
particular attention is paid to the effects of income inequality on these preferences. In
this way, this study attempts to discern whether growing income inequality, as is widely
observed, has an effect on the formation of preferences for redistribution. It is import-
ant to mention that this study does not deal with the realisation of these preferences,
i.e., this study does not analyse whether the actual degree of redistribution observed in
a country corresponds to the realisation of the preferences for redistribution of its citi-
zens. For such analysis, one would need to use a longer period of observations in order
to account for political and economic cycles (like the study by Georgiadis and Manning
(2012) for the UK). The present paper differs from the existing empirical literature in
several respects. It uses a harmonised dataset composed of the total six waves of the
European Social Survey (ESS) carried out between 2002 and 2012, which comprises a
total of 34 countries and 235,842 individuals with non-missing information. This data
is collapsed to construct synthetic panels based on birth year cohorts, sex and country
in order to use pseudo panel techniques (Deaton 1985) and study the changes in in-
equality and preferences more fully. For this purpose, a fixed effects estimator is used.
This strategy allows for overcoming the data limitations and assess the role of changing
inequality on redistributive preferences. Furthermore, the analysis considers that indi-
viduals are not only influenced by the level of income inequality—as measured, for ex-
ample, by the Gini coefficient or the top 1% income share—but also by the degree of
redistribution which is already taking place in the country. In all these cases, the ana-
lyses use comparable and harmonised country level variables that vary over time.
The results indicate that variations in income inequality over time affect prefer-
ences for redistribution. These findings are robust to different measures of income
inequality and specifications with different sizes and numbers of synthetic panels,
and therefore the results provide evidence that preferences for redistribution are
not immobile and that their evolution is influenced by changing income inequality.
The positive effect of the Gini index computed with gross incomes (before tax and
transfers) is particularly relevant for preferences for redistribution because this
index is less influenced by the contemporaneous tax and transfer system. In
addition, it is found that the level of actual redistribution operates in the opposite
direction of income inequality, which helps to explain why some welfarist-oriented
countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden exhibit a lower preference for
redistribution. This can be interpreted as individuals living in economies where sub-
stantial redistribution already exists and do not want more redistribution. It is im-
portant to bear in mind that all these findings must be interpreted as short-time
responses given the limited length of time of the data.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly discuss the relevant litera-
ture. The third section presents the data. The fourth section presents the empirical
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concludes.2 The study of preferences for redistribution
The main prediction of the median voter theorem (Meltzer and Richard 1981) is that
the level of income inequality positively affects the size of income redistribution in the
country. This result has led to the emergence of an important body of empirical studies
trying to test its validity. This literature can be roughly subdivided into two branches:
one branch uses measures of income inequality and redistribution (mostly the Gini co-
efficient and the ratio of median to mean income) at the country or state level. The
other branch uses individual preferences for redistribution. In the first group of studies,
the effect of inequality on redistribution has not received significant empirical support.
Examples are Rodriguez (1999), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996), Moene
and Wallerstein (2001, 2003), Lind (2005) and Shelton (2007). Exceptions are Milanovic
(2000, 2010) and Karabarbounis (2011). The studies of the second branch attempt
to uncover the determinants of individual preferences for redistribution, and some
of these evaluate the effects of income inequality on redistributive preferences (see a
summary in Table 1). Examples of studies assessing the role of economic inequality
on redistributive preferences are Pittau et al. (2013), Kerr (2014), Tóth and Keller
(2011), Yamamura (2012) and Jaeger (2013). The results of the effect of inequality
on the preferences for redistribution are mixed, although a majority of them find a
positive effect. The analysis is mainly based on cross-country differences so that the
problems of unobserved effects and reverse causality come with caution when inter-
preting the results. However, Kerr (2014) uses an IV model to detect a positive ef-
fect of inequality on the demand for redistributions across American states, and
Jaeger (2013) uses a pseudo panel approach. This last study, however, has three
problems that affect the correct estimation and interpretation of the effect of in-
come inequality on preferences for redistribution. The first one is the use of syn-
thetic panels that are constructed on the base of variables (social class position) that
are not immobile over time and not observable for all individuals2, which is a condi-
tion to build proper pseudo panels (Verbeek 2008). The second problem is the use
of Gini indexes from seven different data sources for different countries, and even
for the same country observed in different years3. This mix of sources and years se-
verely limits the comparability of income inequality within and across countries and
over time. Furthermore, the year of some Gini indexes does not correspond with
the year of the ESS wave. The use of household income, without any adjustment, is
also problematic as the ESS does not have a uniform income question across waves4.
Other approaches employed to understand how redistributive preferences are shaped
pay particular attention to the formation of beliefs about income position, informa-
tional limitations on inequality levels and the influence of reference groups. These stud-
ies mostly use experiments as the empirical strategy to deal with the demanding set of
required variables. Relevant examples are Kuziemko et al. (2013) and Cruces et al.
(2013). Furthermore, a recent effort aimed at integrating the many findings and
approaches in the formation of redistributive preferences is presented in Schokkaert
and Truyts (2014) in the form of a model that considers the possibility of assessing
Table 1 Literature on preferences for redistribution
Study Dataset Region Modelling Effect of inequality
Pittau et al. (2013) ESS 2002-2008 23 EU countries Logit
multilevel
+
GSS 2000-2006 US states -
Kerr (2014) GSS 1972 -2000 US (states) OLS + or insignificant
ISSP 1987, 92, 99 Many countries IV OLS
WVS 1990, 95, 00
Tóth and Keller
(2011)
Eurobarometer 1999 EU-27 OLS
Multilevel
+
Yamamura (2012) JGSS 2000-2008 Japan Ordered
Probit
+ for high-income earners,
otherwise insignificant
Jaeger (2013) ESS 2002-2008 31 EU countries FE Pseudo
Panels
insignificant
Luttmer and
Singhal (2011)
ESS 2002-2006 32 EU countries OLS Not studied
Guillaud (2013) ISSP 2006 33 countries Ordered
Logit
Not studied
Alesina and
Giuliano (2011)
GSS 1972-2004 US OLS Not studied
WVS 1981, 90, 95, 99 Many others
Alesina and Fuchs-
Schundeln (2007)
Panel GSOEP 1997-2002 Germany Probit Not studied
Georgiadis and
Manning (2012)
BSAS UK OLS Not studied
Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005)
GSS 1978-91 US Ordered
Probit
Not studied
Corneo and
Grüner (2002)
ISSP 1992 12 developed
countries
Logit Not studied
Fong (2001) Gallup Poll Social Audit
Survey 1998
US Ordered
Probit
Not studied
Acronyms:
ESS: European Social Survey
GSOEP: German Socio Economic Panel
ISSP: International Social Survey Program
GSS: General Social Survey
WVS: World Values Survey
JGSS: Japanese General Social Survey
BSAS: British Social attitudes Survey
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income differences caused by luck are seen as illegitimate, while those arising from ef-
fort are legitimate, and considers a utility function composed by a self-interested and a
social justice part. It is shown that the desired degree of redistribution of an individual
depends on the relative importance of luck, effort and ability assigned to explain in-
come differences in an environment of informational bias originating from the refer-
ence group. This model also helps to understand recent experimental research finding
that better-off individuals are more prone than poorer individuals to recognise other’s
effort when making allocations (Barr et al. 2015).3 Data and variables
3.1 The data
The data is drawn from the complete set of available bi-annual rounds (six rounds) of
the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2012. This survey is designed to
Olivera IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:14 Page 5 of 18measure attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviour patterns of individuals in Europe.
There is a core set of questions implemented in each wave and additional modules in
specific waves. Income inequality measures are drawn from the Standardized World
Income Inequality Database (SWIID version 4.0) because this data—although not with-
out its problems—provides the broadest coverage across countries over time, allowing
for the attainment of the largest number of country-year points, whereas data on
income inequality from Eurostat covers fewer observations5. The SWIID provides Gini
indexes computed with incomes both before and after taxes and transfers, and the top 1%
of share. While the Gini index captures inequality along the total distribution of incomes,
the top income share is useful to capture income concentration at the very top of the in-
come distribution. These measures cover different forms of income inequality and there-
fore make this study more complete. Given the recent revival of the importance of top
incomes (Atkinson et al. 2011), the share of the top 1% of the income distribution is
considered as an additional measure of inequality in the analysis. Pittau et al. (2013) also
use data from a previous version of SWIID to analyse preferences for redistribution,
although they do not use the variation of inequality indices over time. The other
macro variables used in the present analysis are the real and PPP-adjusted GDP per
capita from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and public social protec-
tion expenditures (as percentage of GDP) from Eurostat. A total of 235,842 individuals
have complete information for the variables of interest. This selection comprises a total of
34 countries and represents 152 country-year points. The included countries are the
EU-28 (except Malta) plus Norway, Iceland, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and
Israel.
Not all countries have observations in each wave (see Table 2). There are 15 countries
with observations in all 6 waves: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, 3 countries have information in 5
waves: Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia. Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece,
the Russian Federation and Ukraine have observations in 4 waves. Israel, Italy and
Lithuania are observed in 3 waves. Latvia and Romania are only observed in one period.3.2 The dependent variable
The key question measuring individual preferences for redistribution is repeated in
each wave, which is: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: the
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. The individ-
ual must choose one of five responses, which are rescaled in the following way: strongly
agree (5); agree (4); neither agrees nor disagree (3); disagree (2) and strongly disagree
(1). Therefore, the higher this number, the more it favours redistribution. The average
score of preference for redistribution is increasing across waves, though there are im-
portant differences among countries and years. For example, for those countries with
observations in 2002 and 2012, the score increased in 14 countries and decreased in 3.
The measures of inequality also show variation among countries and years. Between
2002 and 2012, the Gini of net incomes increased in 11 countries and decreased in 6.
The average increase is 5.7% and the average decrease is −5.8%. For the same period,
the Gini of market incomes increased in 10 countries and decreased in 7, with 6.9%
Table 2 Composition of sample
Total 2012 2010 2008 2006 2004 2002 Year
4 x x x x Austria
6 x x x x x x Belgium
4 x x x x Bulgaria
2 x x Croatia
4 x x x x Cyprus
5 x x x x x Czech Rep
6 x x x x x x Denmark
5 x x x x x Estonia
6 x x x x x x Finland
4 x x x x France
6 x x x x x x Germany
4 x x x x Greece
6 x x x x x x Hungary
2 x x Iceland
6 x x x x x x Ireland
3 x x x Israel
3 x x x Italy
1 x Latvia
3 x x x Lithuania
2 x x Luxembourg
6 x x x x x x Netherlands
6 x x x x x x Norway
6 x x x x x x Poland
6 x x x x x x Portugal
1 x Romania
4 x x x x Russian Fed
5 x x x x x Slovakia
6 x x x x x x Slovenia
6 x x x x x x Spain
6 x x x x x x Sweden
6 x x x x x x Switzerland
2 x x Turkey
4 x x x x Ukraine
6 x x x x x x UK
152 Total
Olivera IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:14 Page 6 of 18being the average increase and −5.8% the average decrease. In the case of the top 1% of
income share, this has increased in 12 countries and declined in 5 countries.
The data shows a great deal of variability across countries and over time in redis-
tributive preferences. The mean score for the variable measuring preferences for redis-
tribution (from 1 to 5) in the complete 2002–2012 period is 3.84. The countries with
the highest and lowest scores are Greece with 4.35 and Denmark with 3.03, respectively.
Confirming some regional differences, the Mediterranean countries are placed well
Olivera IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:14 Page 7 of 18above the Nordic countries (see Figure 1). The relation between preferences for redis-
tribution and income inequality is positive when attention is paid to cross-country dif-
ferences, which is reported in the left-hand panel of Figure 2. At first glance, it is
surprising that traditional pro-welfare states like the Nordic countries have simultan-
eously low levels of inequality and lower preferences for redistribution. However, it is
possible that individuals who in general are in favour of income redistribution are less
willing to favour more redistribution if the scale of redistribution already taking place is
high enough. An indication of this can be observed in the right hand panel of Figure 2.
The share of public social protection expenditures to GDP may be interpreted as a rough
measure of the size of redistribution implemented in the country. The figure suggests
some tendency for preferences for redistribution to be lower where the size of
redistribution to GDP is higher.3.3 The control variables
The variables used in the regression analysis are the standard individual controls
employed in the literature of redistributive preferences and include sex, age, marital
status (living with partner), education level in the form ISCED dummies, belonging to
a minority ethnic group in the country (ethnic), and the religious position of the indi-
vidual regardless of any particular religion (religious) in a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10
(very religious). The ESS has no uniform question on household income, but an income
proxy that is asked in every wave is included. This is “which of the descriptions on this
card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?”
with four possible scales: living comfortably on present income (1), coping on present
income (2), difficult on present income (3) and very difficult on present income (4). Of
course, this question may refer to satisfaction with income, so one should be cautious
in interpreting the estimates of this variable. Another group of control variables refers
to labour conditions of the individual and includes the dummy variables retired and
unemployed. Finally, left-right political scale denotes the self-placement of the indi-
vidual in the political spectrum from 0 (left) to 10 (right). The descriptive statistics of
the variables are reported in Table 3.1.0
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Figure 1 Preferences for redistribution by country, 2002-2012.
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Figure 2 Preferences for redistribution and income inequality, 2002-2012.
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In the empirical literature of preferences for redistribution, it is a common practice to
use the multi-scale variable of preferences for redistribution and estimate with OLS.
Examples of this are Georgiadis and Manning (2012), Kerr (2014), Alesina and Giuliano
(2011) and Luttmer and Singhal (2011). All of them argue that the use of alternative
modelling approaches such as the ordered logit model do not change the results. Dif-
ferently, Pittau et al. (2013) recode the original 5-scale question on preferences for re-
distribution into 1/0 and apply a logistic regression with multi-level modelling.
Guillaud (2013) use an ordered logit and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) use ordered
probit and probit models. Even though the specification models of some of these stud-
ies have controlled for country and time effects with dummy variables, one cannot fully
assure that changes in income inequality and redistribution over time have the same ef-
fects over the preferences for redistribution. Panel data can help to study the effects of
income inequality over time because the reaction of the same unit of analysis to chan-
ging inequality can be followed across time. The application of a fixed effects model
will allow for controlling for time-invariant observed and unobserved effects. This is an
essential distinction with respect to pooled OLS models (such as Kerr 2014; Luttmer
and Singhal 2011; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; and Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) be-
cause the differences in the preferences for redistribution may vary irrespective of the
differences in income inequality across countries. In that case, the difference in the
preference for redistribution will be more related to specific and persistent factors of
the country that shape the preferences of their citizens. For example, Karabarbounis
(2011) cite legal origins, political institutions, persistent cultural characteristics, ethnic
fragmentation, prospects of upward mobility, and social beliefs about fairness. Country
differences in culture (Berigan and Irwin 2011) and national identity (Shayo 2009) are
also part of those specific factors that can affect the demand for redistribution. In a
panel data structure with i = 1,…N individuals followed across t = 1,…,T periods, it is
common to use the following specification:
yit ¼ δt þ αi þ βXit þ γZit þ μit ð1Þ
The dependent variable yit measures the individual preference for redistribution in
year t. The vector Xit contains inequality measures that are the same for individuals of
the same country and year. Zit denotes individual and time specific socio-demographic
variables. The term αi is the year-invariant individual unobserved effect; δt is a common
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Total
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
in favour of redistribution 3.74 1.06 3.79 1.06 3.83 1.05 3.84 1.04 3.92 1.04 3.90 1.03 3.84 1.05
gini net incomes 28.24 4.05 28.98 5.08 28.55 4.07 30.12 5.06 29.69 4.69 29.53 4.58 29.26 4.69
gini market incomes 41.70 4.12 41.87 4.57 42.12 5.21 42.44 5.49 42.15 5.63 43.01 5.13 42.24 5.11
top 1% income share 8.26 2.30 8.09 2.10 8.70 3.03 8.89 2.64 8.56 2.45 8.55 2.27 8.53 2.50
log gdp pc 10.22 0.34 10.12 0.50 10.14 0.47 10.11 0.44 10.09 0.42 10.19 0.34 10.14 0.43
social protection expend. 17.14 3.62 17.08 4.09 17.04 3.97 15.32 4.01 18.04 3.60 17.45 3.80 16.97 3.96
left-right political scale 5.12 2.17 5.16 2.18 5.08 2.16 5.19 2.25 5.18 2.17 5.17 2.22 5.16 2.20
male 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50
living with partner 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48
age 45.50 17.47 45.62 17.67 46.55 17.86 46.58 17.81 47.63 18.10 48.10 18.05 46.71 17.87
isced: 1 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.32
isced: 2 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38
isced: 3 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49
isced: 4 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18
isced: 5 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45
isced: other 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04
income: living comfortably 0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46
income: coping on 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50
income: difficult on 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
income: very difficult on 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.25
ethnic 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
religious 4.94 2.90 4.91 2.93 4.72 2.90 4.80 2.96 4.64 2.94 4.57 3.01 4.76 2.95
retired 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.42 0.23 0.42
unemployed 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24
No. of observations 33704 37709 34473 48531 41687 39738 235842
No. of countries 21 25 23 31 27 25 34
O
livera
IZA
Journalof
European
Labor
Studies
 (2015) 4:14 
Page
9
of
18
Olivera IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:14 Page 10 of 18unobservable year-specific effect, and μit is the time-varying individual specific idiosyn-
cratic error. It is well established in the empirical literature that if αi is not controlled
for and instead is let to be part of the composite error, the estimators will be inconsist-
ent. In particular, the inequality measures and other explanatory variables can be corre-
lated with the unobserved individual effects so that without dealing with these effects,
the estimation will suffer from omitted-variables problem. A fixed effect estimator
(FE) will take away the individual unobserved effects by subtracting the time means
of each variable for every individual in the model. The interesting point is that this
procedure will allow the unobserved effect αi to be arbitrarily correlated with the
time-varying explanatory variables.
Unfortunately there is no panel survey to study preferences for redistribution in
Europe, but one can construct a pseudo panel dataset (a practice initiated by Deaton
1985) with the ESS data. A pseudo panel dataset includes groups (generally individuals
grouped in birth cohorts) that can be followed over time. The characteristics of these
groups are built by averaging the individuals identified in each group. It is important
that these groups can be identified by variables that do not change over time. For ex-
ample, the year of birth, sex and countries are the usual identifiers. These groups are
called synthetic or pseudo panels and will appear over time in different cross-sections
of harmonised and comparable surveys. An important characteristic is that these cross-
sections must be random samples of the population, which is fulfilled by the ESS. The
following specification is used for the collapsed dataset, where the sub-index g indicates
a particular synthetic panel and the hat indicates average:
ygt ¼ δt þ αg þ βg Xgt−1 þ γg Zgt þ μgt ð2Þ
The pseudo panels are formed on the basis of birth year cohorts (10)6, sex (2), coun-
try (34) and ESS rounds (6) so that the maximum possible number of synthetic obser-
vations is 10x2x34x6 = 4,080. In Equation 2, the unobserved cohort effect αg is the
average of the unobserved effects over time, but it is standard to assume that this is
time-invariant. If cohort averages are based on a large number of individuals, this is a
reasonable assumption, and one can obtain consistent estimators with an FE model
(Verbeek 2008). Another condition to obtain consistent estimators is that the cohort
averages show genuine time variation. It should be a balance between the number and
size of the cohorts. More cohorts will refrain from small sample problems in the esti-
mators, but fewer individuals in each cohort will reduce the reliability of the averages
taken in the cohort7.
Table 4 reports the composition of the pseudo panels over time and by birth year.
There are a total of 2,657 synthetic observations that summarise the information of
219,102 individuals. The synthetic observations that contained less than 30 respondents
were removed because the averaged variables may not be a good estimate of the char-
acteristics of the cohort. Furthermore, some countries and cohorts are not surveyed in
all years, and hence the total number of panels is lower than the theoretical maximum
of 4,080. The pseudo panel regressions of the next section will include fixed effects
estimators based on Equation 2, use robust standard errors clustered by country and
cohort and include year dummies to control for time effects. The time effects help to
mitigate the effects of spurious trends and contemporaneous panel error correlations
Table 4 Composition of the pseudo panels
Cohort 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Total of pseudo panels Total of respondents
1920-26 26 16 13 6 1 0 62 2,554
1927-33 41 39 39 39 34 20 212 10,841
1934-40 42 47 46 59 52 45 291 19,546
1941-47 42 47 46 62 54 47 298 24,758
1948-54 42 49 46 62 53 50 302 28,734
1955-61 42 49 46 62 54 50 303 29,665
1962-68 42 49 46 62 54 50 303 30,025
1969-75 42 48 46 62 54 49 301 27,890
1976-82 41 48 45 62 53 50 299 24,804
1983-89 32 47 42 62 53 50 286 20,285
Total 392 439 415 538 462 411 2,657 219,102
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planatory variables included in the regressions are only those that vary over time.5 Econometric results
5.1 Main results
The coefficient of self-assessment of political ideology (from 0 = left to 10 = right) is
significant and negative, i.e., leftists are more in favour of redistribution than right-wing
individuals, which is also found in Alesina et al. (2004) and Alesina and Giuliano
(2011). An increase in tertiary education (isced 5) leads to a decrease in the support for
redistribution, but a raise in post-secondary education (isced 4) increases such support.
The coefficient of age indicates that, when cohort effects are controlled, younger rather
than older individuals are more in favour of redistribution. The proxy for family income
indicates that income matters with the demand for redistribution. As other studies
show, individuals with better incomes are less in favour of redistribution, which support
the hypothesis of preferences governed by self-interest. Note, however, that the only
category of income with statistical significance is the one that indicates the best income
(income nowadays: living comfortably). Religiosity, irrespective of any particular reli-
gion, has a positive effect on the redistributive preferences. Pittau et al. (2013) note that
this result may indicate a relationship between the altruism underlying some religions
and the preferences to distribute to the less advantaged. None of the controls related to
the labour market matter on individual preferences for redistribution.
The results reported in columns 1–3 of Table 5 indicate that an increase in any of
the measures of income inequality can raise preferences for redistribution over time.
For example, an additional percentage point in Gini net and Gini market increases the
preferences for redistribution by 0.25% and 0.16%, respectively, evaluated at sample
means. It is notable that all the coefficients of these inequality indices are positive and
statistically significant because each index of income inequality involves different con-
cepts of inequality. Gini net measures inequality of disposable income (income after
transfers and taxes) so that this indicator considers taxation and redistributive policies
in the country. Gini market measures inequality of gross incomes, so that this indicator
is less affected by taxation policies, but it is influenced by labour supply and general
Table 5 Fixed effects estimates for preferences for redistribution
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
gini net 0.0097***
(0.0036)
gini market 0.0060**
(0.0023)
top 1% income share 0.0082**
(0.0037)
social protection expenditures −0.0111**
(0.0047)
log GDP pc 0.1328 0.1365 0.0979
(0.0892) (0.0899) (0.0952)
left-right political scale −0.0849*** −0.0818*** −0.0802*** −0.0796***
(0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0150)
living with partner 0.0815* 0.0766* 0.0755* 0.0666
(0.0430) (0.0425) (0.0429) (0.0456)
age −0.0325*** −0.0301** −0.0262** −0.0266**
(0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0123)
education: isced 2 0.0311 0.0166 0.0154 0.0581
(0.0905) (0.0897) (0.0904) (0.0962)
education: isced 3 −0.0184 −0.0216 −0.0083 0.0119
(0.0865) (0.0860) (0.0865) (0.0861)
education: isced 4 0.4296*** 0.3687*** 0.3832*** 0.4711***
(0.1313) (0.1350) (0.1322) (0.1325)
education: isced 5 −0.1646* −0.1643* −0.1591* −0.2009**
(0.0865) (0.0866) (0.0871) (0.0891)
education: isced 6 0.4762 0.4484 0.5150 0.5370
(0.4879) (0.4876) (0.4893) (0.5023)
income nowadays: living comfortably −0.2756** −0.2668** −0.2710** −0.3555***
(0.1169) (0.1185) (0.1180) (0.1253)
income nowadays: coping on −0.0707 −0.0817 −0.0736 −0.1187
(0.1169) (0.1196) (0.1187) (0.1281)
income nowadays: difficult on −0.0138 −0.0183 −0.0317 −0.1166
(0.1300) (0.1321) (0.1326) (0.1461)
ethnic −0.0471 −0.0359 −0.0256 −0.0507
(0.1045) (0.1046) (0.1047) (0.1275)
religious 0.0251** 0.0279** 0.0260** 0.0165
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0111)
retired 0.0711 0.0698 0.0658 0.0464
(0.0480) (0.0472) (0.0480) (0.0509)
unemployed −0.0586 −0.0842 −0.0832 0.0458
(0.1072) (0.1090) (0.1095) (0.1159)
constant 4.0381*** 3.9139*** 4.3020*** 5.6258***
(1.0176) (1.0120) (1.0485) (0.5989)
Pseudo panels 2657 2657 2657 2348
Adjusted R2 0.180 0.180 0.179 0.161
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered by country and cohort. Each
regression includes year dummies. The reference variable for income and education is “income nowadays: very difficult
on” and “isced 1”.
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Olivera IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:14 Page 13 of 18equilibrium effects. The top 1% income share is an index of income concentration that
is receiving revitalised attention. The inequality measures are lagged one year because
it is possible that synthetic individuals are not fully able to observe contemporaneous
inequality but are in a better position to account for past inequality. Moreover, the
results in column 4 of Table 5 indicate that the actual level of redistribution in the
country (measured with the public social protection expenditures divided by GDP)
reduces the demand for redistribution8. Overall, these results indicate that, in general,
individuals may be in favour of redistribution when income inequality is high, but they
can prefer less redistribution if the actual level of redistribution (measured with public
social protection expenditures) in the country is already high. This can explain, as
noted before, why some traditional welfare oriented countries, like Denmark, Norway
and Sweden may have a lower preference for redistribution. Although employing an-
other empirical strategy, Pittau et al. (2013) also find that social expenditures are nega-
tively associated with the individual demand for redistribution in a hierarchical model
where social expenditures do not vary over time.
The results are similar whether the inequality index employed in the regressions is
lagged two years (Table 6’s middle panel). Furthermore, the results do not differ
whether the inequality index employed in the regressions corresponds to the average of
the one-year and two-year lagged index (Table 6’s bottom panel). For example, in 2012,
Gini net would be the average of this indicator observed in years 2011 and 2010. This
procedure reduces serial correlation and measurement error. Regarding the effects of
income redistribution, it is found that the effect of public social protection expenditures
on redistributive preferences is statistically significant and negative when this variable is
lagged one year or is the average of one-year and two-year lags.Table 6 FE coefficients of different inequality measures
coeff std error adj R2 obs
lagged one year:
gini net 0.0097*** (0.0036) 0.180 2657
gini market 0.0060** (0.0023) 0.180 2657
top 1% income share 0.0082** (0.0037) 0.179 2657
social protection expend, % GDP −0.0111** (0.0047) 0.161 2348
lagged two years:
gini net 0.0071** (0.0033) 0.183 2657
gini market 0.0033* (0.0018) 0.182 2657
top 1% income share 0.0196*** (0.0052) 0.191 2657
social protection expend, % GDP −0.0049 (0.0045) 0.157 2329
1 year lag x 2 year lag:
gini net 0.0088** (0.0035) 0.181 2657
gini market 0.0047** (0.0021) 0.181 2657
top 1% income share 0.0137*** (0.0046) 0.184 2657
social protection expend, % GDP −0.0091* (0.0050) 0.159 2348
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country and cohort. Each row corresponds
to a different regression and only reports the corresponding income inequality coefficient. Each regression includes the
same covariates as in Table 5, and year dummies. In the first panel, inequality measures are lagged one year with
respect to the ESS wave as in previous specifications. In the middle panel, inequality measures are lagged two years.
In the bottom panel, the inequality measures are the averages of the one and two year lags.
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causality, meaning that the level of income inequality in a society depends on the pref-
erences for redistribution of its members. This will be true if the government genuinely
aligns its policies with the redistributive preferences of the individuals and sets up a tax-
ation system that will cancel out any increase in pre-tax and transfer income inequality.
However, it is difficult to establish that a change in redistributive preferences leads to a
change in the taxation system at least in the short-run. Recall that the analysis employs
bi-annual survey waves collected between 2002 and 2012, so the period may be
too short to expect a relation running from preferences to inequality. In any case, it
has been detected that pre-tax and pre-transfer income inequality positively and sig-
nificantly affects the preferences for redistribution. As pointed out by Karabarbounis
(2011), the use of pre-tax and transfer incomes instead of net incomes to construct
the measure of inequality relaxes somewhat the reverse causation because net in-
comes vary automatically with the fiscal system, whilst pre-tax and transfer incomes
vary only through the endogenous response of labour supply or the general equilib-
rium effects on factor prices. The same author uses lags of gross income inequality
and their averages to mitigate the effects of redistribution on inequality through
labour supply and general equilibrium effects. In addition, the top 1% income share
is also computed with pre-tax and transfer incomes so that this indicator also has the
same desirable features of Gini market. As reported in Table 6, the results are robust
with lags (and averages of lags) of pre-tax and transfer income inequality and top
income shares.5.2 Checks
Imposing a minimum size for the number of respondents in each synthetic panel can
create some small sample problems. However, if no limits on the synthetic panel size is
imposed, the econometric results are still very similar, and only the coefficient of the
top 1% income share loses statistical significance. On the other hand, the sample size
n = 30 for each synthetic panel can be considered to be too small and compromise the
reliability of the averaged variables in each cell. But, the coefficients and their statistical
significance practically do not change if a minimum of n = 50 respondents is used in-
stead of 30 for the size of the cells. Furthermore, the value of the adjusted R2 slightly
decreases when no limit is imposed on the cell size and increases when the minimum
size of each cell is 50. Another concern for the consistency of the pseudo panel estima-
tors is the number of synthetic individuals. To check this, two alternative datasets were
constructed by changing the birth year range of the cohorts to be spaced every 10 or
5 years instead of 7. In the first case, there are 7 birth year cohorts producing a total of
1,963 synthetic observations with data. In the second case, there are 14 birth year
cohorts and a total of 3,372 synthetic observations9. The results do not change substan-
tively under both alternatives, and only the coefficient for the average of lagged years of
social protection expenditures loses its statistical significance in the sample with 7
birth cohorts. Furthermore, in the sample with 7 birth cohorts, the adjusted R2
improves slightly. All these results are summarised in Table 7 and reassure that
inequality—measured with three different inequality indexes–positively affects the de-
mand for redistribution.
Table 7 FE estimators with different sizes and numbers of synthetic individuals
Variable Baseline: Cohort size ≥30 Cohort size ≥50 No minimum cohort size Cohort size ≥30 Cohort size ≥30
& 10 birth year cohorts & 10 birth year cohorts & 10 birth year cohorts & 7 birth year cohorts & 14 birth year cohorts
coeff std
error
adj
R2
n coeff std
error
adj
R2
n coeff std
error
adj
R2
n coeff std
error
adj
R2
n coeff std
error
adj
R2
n
lagged one year:
gini net 0.0097*** (0.0036) 0.180 2657 0.0140*** (0.0041) 0.216 2211 0.0083** (0.0036) 0.141 3037 0.0090** (0.0037) 0.208 1963 0.0117*** (0.0037) 0.180 3372
gini market 0.0060** (0.0023) 0.180 2657 0.0065*** (0.0025) 0.213 2211 0.0074*** (0.0022) 0.144 3037 0.0071*** (0.0025) 0.211 1963 0.0066*** (0.0023) 0.180 3372
top 1% income share 0.0082** (0.0037) 0.179 2657 0.0097** (0.0041) 0.213 2211 0.0037 (0.0044) 0.139 3037 0.0065* (0.0039) 0.206 1963 0.0083** (0.0036) 0.178 3372
social protection expend,
% GDP
−0.0111** (0.0047) 0.161 2348 −0.0148*** (0.0049) 0.204 1957 −0.0082* (0.0045) 0.135 2677 −0.0103* (0.0054) 0.187 1736 −0.0111** (0.0044) 0.165 2979
lagged two years:
gini net 0.0071** (0.0033) 0.183 2657 0.0108*** (0.0036) 0.218 2211 0.0052 (0.0032) 0.143 3037 0.0058* (0.0033) 0.209 1963 0.0078** (0.0033) 0.182 3372
gini market 0.0033* (0.0018) 0.182 2657 0.0035* (0.0019) 0.215 2211 0.0035** (0.0017) 0.143 3037 0.0036* (0.0019) 0.210 1963 0.0032* (0.0018) 0.181 3372
top 1% income share 0.0196*** (0.0052) 0.191 2657 0.0207*** (0.0056) 0.225 2211 0.0124** (0.0061) 0.145 3037 0.0172*** (0.0058) 0.216 1963 0.0192*** (0.0049) 0.188 3372
social protection expend,
% GDP
−0.0049 (0.0045) 0.157 2329 −0.0074 (0.0047) 0.197 1942 −0.0021 (0.0046) 0.135 2657 −0.0037 (0.0050) 0.183 1722 −0.0044 (0.0041) 0.161 2954
1 year lag x 2 year lag:
gini net 0.0088** (0.0035) 0.181 2657 0.0131*** (0.0040) 0.217 2211 0.0070** (0.0035) 0.142 3037 0.0077** (0.0035) 0.208 1963 0.0102*** (0.0035) 0.181 3372
gini market 0.0047** (0.0021) 0.181 2657 0.0051** (0.0022) 0.214 2211 0.0055*** (0.0020) 0.143 3037 0.0053** (0.0023) 0.210 1963 0.0049** (0.0021) 0.180 3372
top 1% income share 0.0137*** (0.0046) 0.184 2657 0.0151*** (0.0051) 0.218 2211 0.0074 (0.0055) 0.142 3037 0.0116** (0.0050) 0.210 1963 0.0135*** (0.0045) 0.183 3372
social protection expend,
% GDP
−0.0091* (0.0050) 0.159 2348 −0.0125** (0.0052) 0.201 1957 −0.0056 (0.0049) 0.134 2677 −0.0080 (0.0057) 0.185 1736 −0.0087* (0.0045) 0.163 2979
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country and cohort. Each row corresponds to a different regression and only reports the corresponding income inequality coefficient. Each
regression includes the same covariates as in Table 5, and year dummies. In the first panel, inequality measures are lagged one year with respect to the ESS wave as in previous specifications. In the middle panel,
inequality measures are lagged two years. In the bottom panel, the inequality measures are the averages of the one and two year lags.
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This paper has shown that income inequality of the country matters for prefer-
ences for redistribution when one focusses on changes over time. These results
arise from fixed effects estimators applied to pseudo panels for the period 2002–
2012 in 34 European countries. The findings are robust to different measures of
income inequality and specifications with different sizes and numbers of synthetic
panels. It is shown that increases in pre-tax and transfer income inequality over
time raise the demand for redistribution, which is in line with the predictions of
early political economy models (Meltzer and Richard 1981) that have not found
much empirical support. Income inequality measured with disposable income and
the top 1% income share also positively affects the demand for redistribution.
Looking at the evolution of the top 1% or further concentration shares of income
have become increasingly important in the recent empirical literature about in-
equality, and therefore this study contributes to the understanding of the effects of income
concentration on the demand for redistribution. Another important result is that
the actual level of redistribution implemented in the country, measured with public
expenditures in social protection expenditures, reduces the demand for redistribution.
This helps to explain why some Nordic countries exhibit a rather low support for
redistribution. In sum, at least in Europe and being mindful of the short length of the
period of analysis, one can observe that increasing income inequality leads to more
individual support for redistribution.7 Endnotes
1Georgiadis and Manning (2012); Pittau et al. (2013); Kerr (2014), Alesina and
Giuliano (2011); Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007);
Luttmer and Singhal (2011); Guillaud (2013); Corneo and Grüner (2002); Fong (2001);
Yamamura (2012).
2The social class position is based on ISCO88 occupational codes, which is only
observed for 74% of the ESS 2002–2012 sample.
3Jaeger (2013) (see Appendix’s Table 1) uses the following databases to gather
information for Gini indexes for the years 2002–2010: World Inequality Database,
Wikipedia, http://www.nationmaster.com, http://www.indexmundi.com, Eurostat,
World Bank Databank and CIA World Factbook. In addition, 22 country-year
points of a total of 125 are allocated Gini indexes corresponding to another year.
4The ESS includes a question that indicates which range of total household in-
come the individual belongs to. However, there are two problems in using this
question across all waves. There are 12 ranges in waves 2002–2006, and 10 in
waves 2008–2012. Furthermore, there is a high percentage of individuals that do
not answer the income question of the survey (23% of the full sample).
5The SWIID dataset is built with the United Nations University’s World Income
Inequality Database (WIID), the Luxembourg Income Study dataset (LIS), the World
Top Incomes Database and other country specific data on incomes. This employs a
custom missing-data algorithm to standardised the WIID data by using the LIS data as
the standard. For more details see Solt (2009).
6The oldest birth cohort is 1920–1926, and the youngest is 1983–1989.
Olivera IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:14 Page 17 of 187For more about the asymptotic properties and conditions of pseudo panel estima-
tors, see Verbeek (2008), Verbeek and Vella (2005), Collado (1997) and Moffit (1993).
8GDP per capita is not included in the regression as this is collinear with the social
protection expenditures-GDP ratio.
9In both datasets, the minimum size of the cells is 30 respondents. The average cell
size of the dataset of 7 and 14 birth cohorts is 113 and 62, respectively.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of European Labor Studies is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.
The author declares that he has observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the comments and suggestions made by Brian Nolan, Koen Decancq, an anonymous referee and
conferences and seminar participants at the University of Antwerp, EPCS meeting at the University of Cambridge,
University of Luxembourg, ZEW-Mannheim and Irish Economic Association meeting. The author alone is responsible
for the analysis carried on in this study.
Responsible editor: Sara de la Rica
Received: 9 March 2015 Accepted: 30 March 2015
References
Alesina A, Angeletos GM (2005) Fairness and redistribution. Am Econ Rev 95(4):960–80
Alesina A, Fuchs-Schundeln N (2007) Good Bye Lenin (or not?). The Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences. Am
Econ Rev 97(4):1507–1528
Alesina A, Giuliano P (2011) Preferences For Redistribution. In Handbook Of Social Economics. Benhabib J, Bisin A,
Jackson MO (Eds). North Holland. 93-132
Alesina A, La Ferrara E (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. J Public Econ 89:897–931
Alesina A, Di Tella R, MacCulloch R (2004) Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different? J Public
Econ 88:2009–2042
Atkinson AB, Piketty T, Saez E (2011) Top Incomes in the Long Run of History. J Econ Lit 49(1):3–71
Barr A, Burns J, Miller L, Shaw I (2015) Economic status and acknowledgement of earned entitlement. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.012
Benabou R, Ok EA (2001) Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the POUM hypothesis. Q J Econ
116:447–487
Berigan N, Irwin K (2011) Culture, Cooperation, and the General Welfare”. Soc Psychol Q 74(4):341–360
Collado D (1997) Estimating Dynamic Models from Time Series of Independent Cross Sections. J Econ 82:37–62
Corneo G, Grüner HP (2002) Individual preferences for political redistribution. J Public Econ 83:83–107
Cruces G, Perez-Truglia R, Tetaz M (2013) Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution:
evidence from a survey experiment. J Public Econ 98:100–112
Deaton A (1985) Panel Data from Times Series of Cross-Sections. J Econ 30:109–126
Fong C (2001) Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. J Public Econ 82(2):225–246
Georgiadis A, Manning A (2012) Spend it like Beckham? Inequality and redistribution in the UK, 1983–2004. Public
Choice 151:537–563
Guillaud E (2013) Preferences for redistribution: an empirical analysis over 33 countries. J Econ Inequal 11(1):57–78
Jaeger MM (2013) The effect of macroeconomic and social conditions on the demand for redistribution a pseudo
panel approach. Journal of European Social Policy 23:149–163
Karabarbounis L (2011) One Dollar, One Vote. Econ J 121:621–649
Kerr W (2014) Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials. J Monet
Econ 66:62–78
Kuziemko I, Norton M, Saez E, Stantcheva S (2013) How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from
Randomized Survey Experiments. NBER Working Paper 18865
Lind JT (2005) Why is there so little redistribution? Nordic Journal of Political Economy 31:111–125
Luttmer EFP, Singhal M (2011) Culture, Context and the Taste for Redistribution. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy 3(1):157–179
Meltzer AH, Richard SF (1981) A rational theory of the size of the government. J Polit Econ 89(5):914–27
Milanovic B (2000) The median voter hypothesis, income inequality and income redistribution: an empirical test with
the required data. Eur J Polit Econ 16(3):367–410
Milanovic B (2010) Four critiques of the redistribution hypothesis: An assessment. Eur J Polit Econ 26:147–154
Moene KO, Wallerstein M (2001) Inequality, social insurance and redistribution. Am Polit Sci Rev 95:859–874
Moene KO, Wallerstein M (2003) Earnings, inequality and welfare spending: a disaggregated analysis. World
Politics 55:485–516
Moffit R (1993) Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Models with a Time Series of Repeated Cross-Sections.
J Econ 59:99–124
Perotti R (1996) Democracy, income distribution and growth: what the data says. J Econ Growth 1:149–187
Persson T, Tabellini G (1994) Is inequality harmful for growth?: theory and evidence. Am Econ Rev 84:600–621
Piketty T (1995) Social mobility and redistributive politics. Q J Econ 110(3):551–84
Olivera IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:14 Page 18 of 18Pittau MG, Massari R, Zelli R (2013) Hierarchical modelling of disparities in preferences for redistribution. Oxf Bull Econ
Stat 75(4):556–584
Rodriguez FC (1999) Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States. Economics
& Politics 11(2):171–199
Schokkaert E, Truyts T (2014) Preferences for Redistribution and Social Structure. KU Leuven Discussion Paper Series
DPS14.01
Shayo M (2009) A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and Redistribution.
American Political Science Review 103:147–174
Shelton CA (2007) The size and composition of government expenditure. J Public Econ 91:2230–2260
Solt F (2009) Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. Soc Sci Q 90(2):231–242, SWIID Version 3.1,
December 2011
Tóth, IG, Keller T (2011) Income distributions, inequality perceptions and redistributive claims in European societies. Gini
Discussion Paper Number 7
Verbeek M (2008) Pseudo Panels and Repeated Cross-Sections. In: Matyas L, Sevestre P (eds) The Econometrics of Panel
Data: Fundamentals and Recent Developments in Theory and Practice. Springer, Berlin
Verbeek M, Vella F (2005) Estimating Dynamic Models from Repeated Cross-Sections. J Econ 127:83–102
Yamamura E (2012) Social capital, household income, and preferences for income redistribution. Eur J Polit Econ
28:498–511Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
